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Abstract 
This article analyses the potential of Principle 31 of the Yogyakarta Principles plus 10 
to smash the gender binary. Principle 31 proposes several innovations with regards to 
the registration of people’s gender on official documents and/or in state registries. In 
order to understand the practical meanings of these innovations, the article inspects 
exemplary jurisdictions that have realised some of the Principle’s suggestions. Queer 
and feminist theories serve as the normative framework to understand how Principle 
31 smashes the static binary gender registration in the form of F and M. Moreover, 
relying on developments in international law helps to comprehend the context in 
which Principle 31 was created and its innovative nature. The four central reforms 
proposed by Principle 31 are discussed in independent sections in the article. They 
include the elimination of gender markers, unconditional gender recognition laws, the 
introduction of non-binary legal gender categories and the elimination of the public 
gender registration. The article concludes that all of these four measures face specific 
limitations in how they smash the gender binary, but, as a whole, they trouble the 
naturalised understanding of dichotomous (legal) gender relations. Finally, Principle 
31 alerts to the necessity of reducing the naturalised state control over people’s gender 
assignment, while making sure that where the state (still) has control, it valorises 
gender diversity outside of a binary frame. 
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The gender binary, which assumes that women and men are naturally 
complementary, opposite and mutually exclusive categories, has long existed as a 
principle structuring social and legal relations around the world.3 The answer to the 
famous question “Is it a boy or a girl?” not only affects the social role assigned to a 
newborn but also continues to influence its legal rights and duties. While the 
assignment of a gender4 at birth restricts everybody’s choices and personal 
development, the assumption that gender identity/expression and sexual orientation 
are conditioned upon the appearance of sex characteristics has in particular 
detrimental effects for the social and legal acceptance of LGBTIQ5 persons. ‘Smashing 
the Binary’ has thus become a prominent slogan among queer and feminist activists 
in order to demand the dismantling of heteronormative, cisnormative and 
endosexnormative legal and social structures.  
 
In the following article, I will analyse the potential of Principle 31 of the 
Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10 (YP+10),6 an international document on the rights of 
LGBTIQ persons released in 2017, to smash the gender binary. Principle 31 of the 
YP+10 concerns the right to legal recognition and proposes several reforms for the 
public registration of people’s gender.7 In order to understand the practical meanings 
of the innovations put forward by Principle 31, I am examining exemplary 
jurisdictions that have implemented some of the Principle’s suggestions concerning 
the public registration of gender through the perspective of queer and feminist 
 
2 Some information presented in this article was collected during my work as consultant for ILGA-
Europe. See also: Holzer, 2018. 
3 Not all societies have a rigid binary understanding of gender (e.g. Hollimon 2015; Hossain 2017; 
Wieringa 2010).  
4 The meanings and differences of the terms sex and gender have been debated extensively in feminist 
research. While the possibility to clearly separate the two concepts is contested, sex is commonly used 
to refer to physical sex characteristics and gender to a social role and/or identity. As my conviction is 
that until states register one of the two as part of personal status procedures, they should record a 
person’s social role or identity, instead of physical characteristics, I am using mainly the term gender 
instead of sex in this article.  
5 LGBTIQ stands in this article for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Intersex and Queer.   
6 The Yogyakarta Principles plus 10. Additional Principles and State Obligations on the Application of 
International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Gender 
Expression and Sex Characteristics to Complement the Yogyakarta Principles, 2017. 
7 Next to gender registration procedures, Principle 31 also addresses mechanisms to change names, 
which are often intertwined with those for changing the legal gender. However, in this article, I will 
focus only on the latter ones, while an analysis of regulations concerning the official registration of 
names is left to another occasion. 
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theories. In addition, I will reference relevant developments in international law in 
order to understand the context in which the proposals of Principle 31 were made and 
their innovative nature. The article thus aims to introduce the reader to the legal and 
societal effects of current changes in the field of legal gender registration, but due to 
space constraints, it cannot provide the level of critical analysis that each of the 
addressed reform projects would deserve. Moreover, the examples discussed are not 
exhaustive of current developments in the field of gender registration but have been 
selected because they constitute exceptional alternatives to the otherwise static binary 
gender registration. 
 
My theoretical framework for an analysis of the potential of Principle 31 to 
smash the gender binary is informed by queer feminist theories, in particular Judith 
Butler’s and Judith Lorber’s work. Butler understands gender as performance that 
comes into existence only through the enactment of naturalised scripts, instead of 
describing it as an innate stable essence (2007, pp. xv-xvi, 34, 192). She further sees the 
compulsory integration into the gender binary as a source of continuously re-enacted 
violence and oppression (2007, pp. xi, 155; 2004, p. 35), while Lorber (2006) is calling 
for a “feminist degendering movement”, which shall aim to subvert binaries, such as 
women vs. men and homosexuals vs. heterosexuals. Lorber identifies the binary legal 
gender registration as one of several structures that uphold gender binaries, which 
always contain assumptions of “one dominant and one subordinate group, one 
normal and one deviant identity, one hegemonic status and one ‘other’” (1996, p. 145). 
This binary structure has legitimised many gender inequalities, such as the 
exploitation of women but also the discrimination of LGBTIQ persons (Lorber 2000, 
pp. 79–83). In addition to queer feminist theories as put forward by Butler and Lorber, 
I will also mobilise other feminist concepts, for instance “strategic essentialism” by 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, to understand the role that the official registration of 
gender plays in gender politics.  
 
As there is no specific international treaty on the rights of LGBTIQ persons, the 
Yogyakarta Principles (YP),8 which were created by a group of human rights experts 
in 2007, have been the most influential international document in this field. The 
Principles have been described as “modest” demands based on “stable foundations”, 
because they apply concepts deeply enshrined in international law, such as the 
principle of non-discrimination, to the issues of sexual orientation and gender identity 
 
8 The Yogyakarta Principles, Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in 
Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 2007. 
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(Thoreson 2009). The updated YP+10 issued in 2017 are more forward-looking and 
reflect novelties in international law rather than the accepted status quo. One novelty 
is Principle 31, which challenges the idea that gender is a static and binary legal 
category that states must record as part of personal status registrations, a view that 
was still taken for granted in the original Principles.  
 
Principle 31 of the YP+10 addresses the problem that currently many trans and 
some intersex persons are officially registered with a gender that does not coincide 
with their gender identity, gender expression or physical appearance in a binary logic. 
Having a legal gender recorded in state registries and on identification documents 
that does not “match” one’s identity can result in persons being outed and scrutinised 
in everyday situations, such as when applying for jobs or being checked for identity 
papers. Indeed, studies have shown that as a reaction to “mismatching” IDs, trans and 
intersex persons often experience harassment, physical violence and exclusion from 
housing or employment (James et al. 2016, pp. 89–90, 150, 179). In addition, they are 
frequently denied access to rights that are dependent upon a person’s legal gender 
(e.g. marriage, retirement age). International human rights bodies therefore 
increasingly consider the right to change the legal gender, also often called the right 
to gender recognition, a human right (Madrigal-Borloz 2018, paras. 19–24). Indeed, 
since 1972, when Sweden became reportedly the first country that allowed a change 
of legal gender (Garland 2015, p. 282), about half of all countries worldwide – clear 
numbers are difficult to obtain – have introduced gender recognition procedures 
(Chiam, Duffy and González Gil 2017; Transrespect, n.d.). However, almost all of 
these countries allow a change of legal gender only upon satisfaction of restrictive 
preconditions and limit the options to the gender categories F and M. Organisations 
representing trans and intersex persons have therefore called for a revisitation of the 
permanent registration of F or M on official documents and public registries, a call 
also reflected in Principle 31 of the YP+10 (TGEU 2018; Third International Intersex 
Forum 2013).  
 
As Principle 31 proposes four major innovations concerning the public gender 
registration, the article is structured along these four reform proposals. These include: 
the elimination of gender markers from identification documents (section I); the 
adoption of unconditional gender recognition laws (section II), the introduction of non-
binary legal gender categories (section III) and the abolition of the gender registration 
for personal status purposes (section IV). Each section starts off with explaining the 
practical meanings of the innovation and concludes with an analysis on the impacts 
for the gender binary.  




I. Elimination of gender markers on identification documents  
 
While Principle 3 of the original YP focused on ensuring that identity documents 
“reflect the person’s profound self-defined gender identity”, Principle 31 rejects the 
use of gender markers for identification purposes. It says that states shall register 
personal information on identity documents only if it is “relevant, reasonable and 
necessary” for a legitimate purpose and thereby, end the registration of gender or sex 
on identification documents altogether. The use of gender markers for identification 
purposes entails relying on cisnormative, endosexnormative9 and gender 
stereotypical assumptions about how persons with an F, M or X on their identity cards 
look like. It thus exposes persons with a gender marker that does not match these 
assumptions, including some trans and intersex persons as well as certain endosex cis 
persons transgressing gender norms (e.g. “masculine” cis women), to societal 
scrutiny. For these reasons, gender markers are not always reasonable or reliable 
identification criteria. Indeed, using biometric data, such as fingerprints and iris 
 
9 The term endosex is a rather new word and used in this article to refer to persons with sex 
characteristics that fit medical norms for female and male bodies. Endosexnormative means therefore 
that endosex persons are considered as the norm.  
Principle 31:  
THE RIGHT TO LEGAL RECOGNITION 
Everyone has the right to legal recognition without reference to, or requiring assignment or disclosure of, sex, 
gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics. Everyone has the right to 
obtain identity documents, including birth certificates, regardless of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender 
expression or sex characteristics. Everyone has the right to change gendered information in such documents 
while gendered information is included in them. 
STATES SHALL: 
A. Ensure that official identity documents only include personal information that is relevant, reasonable and 
necessary as required by the law for a legitimate purpose, and thereby end the registration of the sex and gender 
of the person in identity documents such as birth certificates, identification cards, passports and driver licences, 
and as part of their legal personality; 
B. Ensure access to a quick, transparent and accessible mechanism to change names, including to gender-
neutral names, based on the self-determination of the person; 
C. While sex or gender continues to be registered: 
i. Ensure a quick, transparent, and accessible mechanism that legally recognizes and affirms each person’s self-
defined gender identity; 
ii. Make available a multiplicity of gender marker options; 
iii. Ensure that no eligibility criteria, such as medical or psychological interventions, a psycho-medical 
diagnosis, minimum or maximum age, economic status, health, marital or parental status, or any other third 
party opinion, shall be a prerequisite to change one’s name, legal sex or gender; 
iv. Ensure that a person’s criminal record, immigration status or other status is not used to prevent a change of 
name, legal sex or gender. 
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recognition, for identification purposes is a desirable alternative to gender markers, 
which are increasingly considered as “archaic means of verification”(TGEU 2018, p. 
4).  
 
Interestingly, even though some scholars and civil society organisations have 
started to approach gender markers from the angle of the right to privacy, the YP and 
its updated version from 2017 do not directly relate the discussion on gender markers 
to the protection of privacy.10 However, the positive effects on the right to privacy of 
eliminating gender markers from identity cards were stressed by the NGO 
Transgender Europe, stating clearly that “the recording and display of a visible gender 
marker in an individual’s identity documents infringe upon the right to 
privacy”(TGEU 2018, p. 4). Marjolein van den Brink and Jet Tigchelaar have equally 
called out for classifying gender as sensitive personal identity marker (2015, p. 40). 
Indeed, so far, data protection laws, such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation, 
implemented in 2018, do not restrict the disclosure of gender or sex as they do for 
other personal characteristics, including racial or ethnic origin, religious beliefs and 




While indeed innovative, the call for eliminating gender markers reflects current 
discussions in several states and international bodies. Several jurisdictions, for 
instance some US cities (Neuman Wipfler 2016, pp. 525–526), Ontario (Ministry of 
Government and Consumer Services, 2016) and the Netherlands (Ministerie van 
Veiligheid en Justitie, 2016), recently eliminated gender markers from certain official 
documents or encouraged their elimination from cards of private entities (e.g. Dutch 
transport cards). Tasmania made headlines in 2019 when it removed a reference to 
gender or sex from birth certificates through the adoption of the Justice and Related 
Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019. According to Section 22 of the 
Act, a newborn’s sex or gender continues to be recorded as F or M in the birth registry, 
but will no longer be shown on the birth certificate, unless parents or the person 
concerned, who has attained the age of 16, explicitly request this. Moreover, Section 
14 introduced the possibility to change the legal gender not only among F and M but 
 
10 The YP do address the right to privacy in Principle 6(F), in particular the right to “choose when, to 
whom and how to disclose information pertaining to their sexual orientation or gender identity”, but 
fail to question whether the use of gender markers itself breaches the right to privacy. 
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also to the categories “indeterminate gender”, “non-binary” or “a word, or a phrase, 
that is used to indicate a person’s perception of the person’s self”.  
 
At the international level, the discussion on the usefulness of gender markers 
started when intersex persons gained more visibility in the human rights discourse. 
In 2015, following reports of the German and Swiss Ethic Commissions (German 
Ethics Council 2013, pp. 166–167; Swiss National Advisory Commission on 
Biomedical Ethics 2012, pp. 14–15), the Commissioner for Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe urged all member states to “consider the proportionality of 
requiring gender markers in official documents” in a report on the human rights of 
intersex persons (2015, p. 9). A Dutch study had concluded shortly before that there 
are basically no constraints under international law of leaving the legal gender 
indeterminate in certain cases (Van den Brink and Tigchelaar 2014, p. 6). Yet, one 
limitation concerns passports, since guidelines from 2015 by the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) prescribe that gender shall be noted in form of F, M or 
X on international travel documents (p. 14). These guidelines were transposed into EU 
law, through Council Regulation 2252/2004 on biometric passports, which obliges all 
EU member states to issue passports in line with ICAO guidelines (Preamble para 3, 
Annex para 2).11 This means that at least EU member states are legally obliged to keep 
gender markers on passports, even though they could substitute an F or M with an X. 
 
Are gender markers a necessity in a gender-divided world? 
 
The rationale of registering gender publicly seems to be the facilitation of binary 
gender divisions in society and law. In 2014, the British Passport Office held in a 
review on the usefulness of gender markers that gender markers can serve as “proof 
of identity to access gender-specific services”(HM Passport Office 2014, p. 2).12 Indeed, 
as long as certain laws establish different rights and duties for women and men, such 
as those concerning inheritance, the conscription to the military and employment 
benefits, it remains necessary to “prove” one’s legal gender at times. Yet, in the rare 
case that a person must legally prove their gender, countries could also rely on the 
 
11 In 2012, the ICAO guidelines on gender markers were subject to a review, which concluded that the 
negative impacts of abolishing gender markers from passports, such as the unrecognisability of 
documents by electronic border systems, outweigh the advantages of avoiding problems for trans 
travellers. However, it held that the necessity of gender markers can be reconsidered once electronic 
border control systems do not rely on gender markers anymore (ICAO 2012). 
12 See also: Van den Brink and Tigchelaar 2014, p. 3. 
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civil registry instead of using gender markers. However, not all countries have central 
registries that collect all personal status information. For example, many countries in 
the Global South (partly) lack such registries, due to weak bureaucracies, and 
common-law countries tend to have separate records for different public institutions, 
instead of one central information source (Van den Brink, Reuß and Tigchelaar 2015, 
p. 284; Gössl 2013, p. 302). Another strategy for getting rid of the need to include 
gender markers on identification documents is to ensure complete formal gender 
equality by eliminating all differences for women and men in laws. This would resolve 
most situations in which one must prove the (legal) gender for determining their 
rights and duties.  
 
However, even if all laws were gender neutral, gender would continue to 
matter for the organisation of society, such as for gender-divided spaces (e.g. changing 
rooms, prisons), services (e.g. counselling for women) and sports. Most trans rights 
organisations advocate for self-identification as means to determine a person’s gender 
with regards to gender-segregated institutions, but many gender non-conforming 
persons continue to face exclusions from gender-segregated places. Indeed, a look into 
different domestic jurisdictions reveals that having a legal gender that fits a gender-
segregated institution does not necessarily guarantee the access to the institution. For 
example, Alex Sharpe, Peter Dunne and Tara Hewitt explain that in the UK, trans 
women whose legal gender is male, but who have undergone, are undergoing, or plan 
to undergo some process of transition, must generally have access to women-only 
spaces (Dunne and Hewitt 2018; Sharpe 2018).13 At the same time, any person, 
including trans women recognized as female, can be excluded from gender-
segregated spaces if this serves “a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim” 
(Sharpe 2018).14 Moreover, the Canadian Supreme Court held in Vancouver Rape Relief 
Society v. Nixon et al.(2007) that a trans woman, who was legally recognised as female, 
could be lawfully excluded from volunteering in a women-only rape counselling 
centre. Thus, legally speaking, gender markers do not necessarily ensure access to 
gender-divided institutions. Nevertheless, socially speaking, they can transfer 
legitimacy upon a person’s gender identity by serving as a kind of state-certification, 
which could open doors to gender-segregated institutions (Cooper and Renz 2016, p. 
496; Neuman Wipfler 2016, p. 541). Therefore, as long as they correspond to the 
 
13 As Dunne and Hewitt explain, the Equality Act 2010 provides two exceptions that allow the exclusion 
of trans women if this serves a “proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”. As the explanatory 
note to the Act holds, the prime example to this exception is when clients of group counselling sessions 
for female victims of sexual assault do not attend the sessions due to the presences of trans women. 
However, this exception is rarely applied (Dunne and Hewitt 2018). 
14 See also: Cooper and Renz 2016, pp. 496–497.  
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cardholder’s gender identity, gender markers can assist gender non-conforming 
persons in being accepted in gender-segregated institutions. In addition, they can help 
in avoiding the “misgendering”, the wrong use of pronouns and titles, of gender non-
conforming persons.  
 
Finally, the ICAO stressed that gender markers are a necessary tool to collect 
gender-disaggregated data, such as about travellers (2012, p. 5). This assumes that a 
person’s gender is discernible from their identity card, which is not always the case 
for trans and intersex persons. Gender markers can indeed be a practical and relatively 
cheap instrument for collecting gender disaggregated data, since in the majority of 
cases, the legal gender indicates a person’s gender role and identity. However, surveys 
could replace the use of gender markers for the collection of data, which have the 
advantage of capturing a person’s gender identity and/or gender expression, instead 
of the legal gender, but are generally a more expensive instrument for data collection. 
 
Does the elimination of gender markers smash the binary? 
 
Removing a reference to gender on official documents reduces the relevance of gender 
for identification purposes and can positively impact the right to privacy. This can 
contribute to Lorber’s “feminist degendering movement”, since using gender markers 
to identify people assumes that a person’s gender expression “matches” the person’s 
gender marker in a binary logic, which mostly entails the reliance and reproduction 
of cisnormative, endosexnormative and stereotypical assumptions on gender 
expression. Eliminating gender markers from identification documents can thus 
reduce the policing of gender expression by disconnecting it from the legal gender.  
 
Nevertheless, eliminating gender markers does not necessarily resolve the 
gender binary in law, because states can continue to record individuals’ gender in 
registries and to make a legal difference between people based on their gender. In the 
logic of Butler, this would mean that humans are still subjected to “disciplinary 
violence” when being assigned to a gender at birth, even if the gender is no longer 
mentioned on official documents. Moreover, not having any gender markers on 
identification documents would not necessarily render the documents gender neutral. 
For example, first and last names often imply a person’s (legal) gender (e.g. many 
Slavic last names contain gendered endings), which is why Principle 31 also demands 
in Section B that names can be easily changed, including to gender-neutral names. 
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This means that as long as names continue to be gendered, gender can be used as tool 
of identification, even if gender markers were no longer included on identity cards. 
Besides, eliminating gender markers could take away “an authoritative resource in 
situations of perceived gender misrecognition” (Cooper and Renz 2016, p. 496), 
including situations in which gender non-conforming persons want to access gender-
segregated institutions. It would further make the collection of gender-disaggregated 
data more costly, since relying on gender markers would need to be substituted with 
surveys.  
 
II. Unconditional gender recognition laws  
 
Next to the elimination of gender markers on official documents, Principle 31 of the 
YP+10 also advocates for the introduction of unconditional gender recognition 
procedures based on the principle of self-determination. It holds in Section C that 
gender recognition procedures shall be “quick, transparent and accessible” and 
without subject to any barriers, such as eligibility criteria, a person’s status or any 
other third party opinion. This means that states should no longer be able to ask 
preconditions that are currently common for gender recognition, including the 
requirement of having undergone sterilisation or gender affirmation treatment, 
having obtained a psychological diagnosis of “gender dysphoria” and being 
unmarried. Hence, by explicitly condemning psychological “treatment” as 
precondition for changing the legal gender, Principle 31 differs from the original YP, 
which only mentioned medical treatment and personal statuses (e.g. marital and 
parental status) as unlawful barriers to gender recognition in Principle 3.  
 
The demand to allow people to change their legal gender unconditionally and 
without satisfying specific requirements reflects an international trend. More and 
more countries follow the example of Argentina, which through the passing of the Ley 
Identidad de Genero in 2012 became the first country worldwide that introduced a 
simple administrative gender recognition procedure that allows applicants to change 
from F to M or vice versa without fulfilling any conditions.15 The exact procedures for 
changing the legal gender in countries such as Argentina differ in details, but they 
have in common that the change of legal gender is based on the principle of self-
 
15 For more information on gender recognition laws worldwide, see: Chiam et al. 2017.  
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determination and no longer depends on the consent of third parties, such as judges, 
doctors, psychologists and spouses.16  
Among the major international human rights bodies, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR) has endorsed unconditional gender recognition procedures 
the most unequivocally. In its Advisory Opinion on Gender Identity, and Equality and 
Non-Discrimination of Same-Sex Couples (2017), the Court held that:  
“States should respect the physical and mental integrity of individuals by providing legal 
recognition of their self-perceived gender identity without obstacles or abusive 
requirements that may constitute human rights violations”(para. 129). 
 
Unconditional gender recognition laws have equally been supported by the majority 
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which in 2015 in a 
resolution called on member states to abolish the requirement of being diagnosed with 
gender dysphoria, next to those of divorce, sterilisation, surgical interventions and 
other medical treatments (paras. 6.2.2, 6.2.3). The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) has acted only partly in accordance with the views of the Assembly in A.P., 
Garçon and Nicot v. France (2017). It held in paragraph 135 that requiring body 
alterations which can result in the person’s sterilisation for the purpose of gender 
recognition violate the right to private and family life (Article 8) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.17 Nevertheless, the Court confirmed in this case that 
states can continue to ask applicants to be diagnosed with gender dysphoria and to 
undergo body alterations not resulting in sterilisation, such as mastectomy and 
hormone treatment, before they can change the legal gender (paras. 143, 144). 
 
Resistance against unconditional gender recognition laws 
 
As the hotly debated reform of the Gender Recognition Act in the United Kingdom 
shows (e.g. Editorial 2018), unconditional gender recognition laws challenge societal 
preconceptions on the gender binary and who is considered as a woman or a man. 
The use of self-identification as a means to determine a person’s gender has been at 
 
16 Other examples for countries with unconditional gender recognition laws include Chile (2018), 
Ireland (2015) and  Pakistan (2018). 
17  In Y.Y. v. Turkey (2015), the Court ruled that Turkey violated the same article when denying the 
applicant to undergo gender re-assignment surgery without prior sterilisation, but it did not clarify 
whether mandatory sterilisation as requirement for legal gender recognition is per se unlawful. 
Similarly, the Court avoided to address the legality of requiring gender affirmation procedures for the 
purpose of gender recognition in X v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2019).  
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the core of not only this debate but also in the so-called “transgender bathroom battle” 
in the United States (Thoreson 2016). For example, conservatives and religious voices 
have expressed the fear that allowing trans persons to use the bathrooms that 
correspond to their gender identity would make the family unit and “society’s 
definition of humanity” crumble and destroy the “once-obvious definition of male 
and female”(Chumley 2016). States have used similar arguments for defending 
restrictive gender recognition laws or the complete lack thereof. For example, in 2019, 
the Japanese Supreme Court argued that sterilisation and gender affirmative 
treatment are legitimate requirements for accessing gender recognitions procedures, 
since they “prevent “problems” in parent-child relations that could lead to societal 
“confusion” and “abrupt changes” in society”(Faget, 2019). 
 
Another argument used for justifying requirements for gender recognition is 
that these are needed to ensure certainty in historical records of civil status (Van den 
Brink and Snaathorst 2017, p. 5). For example, the UK government argued in Rees v. 
The United Kingdom (1986) at the ECtHR that changing the gender marker on birth 
certificates would falsify historical facts (paras. 21, 42(b)). The ECtHR rejected this 
argument in the landmark case Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom (2003), which 
established the right of a post-operative “transsexual” person to change the legal 
gender. It held that the British civil registry already changes records of the civil status 
concerning legitimisation and adoption, and that making another exception for trans 
persons would not pose a significant burden to the bureaucratic system (paras. 86, 87). 
Similarly to the UK, Dutch politicians have argued that the requirement of providing 
an expert declaration to access gender recognition procedures in the Netherlands 
helps to ensure that the conviction to change a legal gender is permanent, since 
repeated changes would create a mess in the civil registry and are undesirable as the 
birth certificate is a legal document (Van den Brink and Snaathorst 2017, p. 5).  
 
Apart from bureaucratic hurdles and legal certainty, identity fraud is often 
invoked as argument against self-identification in gender recognition issues. For 
example, Dutch registrars have argued that unconditional gender recognition 
procedures could facilitate fraud by making persons changing their legal gender 
untraceable in the civil registry, which could enable them to get rid of civil penalties, 
such as parking fines (Van den Brink and Snaathorst 2017, p. 6). However, a Dutch 
study held that changing the legal gender, or name, is much less likely to create 
untraceability in the civil registry than errors in other elements recorded, such as the 
address (Van den Brink and Snaathorst 2017, p. 6). The possibility of deceit is also 
invoked in the current discussion on the reform of the Gender Recognition Act in the 
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UK, since some people have expressed fear that unconditional procedures would 
enable men to fraudulently enter women-only-spaces or benefit from affirmative 
action for women.18 However, gender recognition requirements cannot stop people 
who “disguise” themselves as women for the purpose of harming them, because, as 
discussed previously, according to current UK Equality Law, one’s legal gender 
assignment does not determine whether a person has the right to access women-only 
spaces (Dunne and Hewitt, 2018; Sharpe 2018). Susanne Lilian Gössl and Berit 
Völzmann further reported that legal genders are rarely used to determine a person’s 
eligibility to benefit from affirmative action for women; instead, self-identification or 
external perception of the person’s gender is determinative (Gössl and Völzmann 
2019, p. 420). Thus, basing gender recognition laws on the principle of self-
determination would not change much as regards the eligibility to benefit from 
women-only institutions and affirmative action, at least not for countries like the UK. 
In addition, there is no indication that fraud has been a problem in countries that 
already provide unconditional gender recognition laws, such as in Argentina (Gössl 
and Völzmann 2019, p. 421).19 Gössl and Völzmann further argue that gender fraud is 
unlikely, because it can cause ostracism and even result in legal punishment (Gössl 
and Völzmann 2019, p. 421). One should also not forget that trans persons are fighting 
hard to gain the right to change their legal gender, precisely because misrecognition 
can lead to a range of negative repercussions. Changing legal gender for fraudulent 
purposes would expose the persons concerned to negative repercussions that are 
similar to those experienced by trans persons who have not altered their legal gender.  
 
Lastly, restrictive requirements for gender recognition have been justified by 
arguing that these protect people from committing an error in a moment of 
“confusion” or as a consequence of a psychosis. This claim loses its validity if the 
decision to change the legal gender can be easily reversed and if irreversible 
preconditions, such as body alterations, are not required for gender recognition in the 
first place. In addition, there is little indication that unconditional gender recognition 
laws result in more “erroneous” decisions than those procedures that require 
preconditions for changing the legal gender (Van den Brink and Snaathorst 2017, pp. 
6–7). 
 
18 Interestingly, due to the beliefs that “women are inherently vulnerable and men are dangerous”, the 
discussions on fraud mostly centre on men disguising as women and not vice versa (Westbrook and 
Schilt 2014, p. 32). 
19 I have only come across one case of gender fraud in Argentina, where a cis man working as a civil 
servant changed his legal gender in order to benefit from earlier retirement reserved for women (Daily 
Nation 2018). 




Do unconditional gender recognition laws smash the binary? 
As research on Argentina shows, the introduction of unconditional gender recognition 
laws creates a range of positive changes for the rights of trans persons, such as in the 
field of education, health care, work, security, and civil rights (Arístegui et al. 2017). 
However, Argentina and most other countries that allow the change of legal gender 
without fulfilling any conditions recognise only two gender categories: F and M. 
Exceptions are California and Tasmania, which provide unconditional gender 
recognition procedures next to non-binary legal gender categories, and Malta, which 
allows an X marker on passports, residence permit and identity cards (Justice and 
Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019 (TAS); Legislative 
Council California 2017; Pace 2017). In addition, most of the countries that have 
introduced unconditional gender recognition laws – Norway is an exception – 
demand that people fulfil certain conditions if they want to change the legal gender 
for a second time (Van den Brink and Snaathorst 2017, p. 7).20 This mirrors the 
assumption that every person has one “true” gender identity and that gender is a 
stable and permanent identity characteristic, which is contrary to Butler’s view of 
gender being performative without following a natural inner sense (2015, pp. xv-xvi, 
34, 192). 
 
Despite the discussed limitations, unconditional gender recognition laws stop 
reproducing the assumption that the body, including its appearance, determines a 
person’s legal gender and that there is a “test” to determine somebody’s “true” gender 
identity. This not only makes life easier for any person wishing to change their legal 
gender from M to F or vice versa, but also challenges the boundaries between the 
socially accepted notions of men and women. For example, abolishing the sterilisation 
requirement for the purpose of gender recognition troubles binary parenting roles, 
such as by creating the possibility that legal men give birth. This can lead to a 
“degendering movement”, in which the social roles of women and men no longer 
differ, which would also undermine the view that women and men are dichotomous 




20 For example, in Argentina, a judicial authorisation is required if a person wants to switch back to the 
previous legal gender assignment (Arístegui et al. 2017, p. 447). 
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III. Introduction of non-binary legal gender categories 
 
The original YP neither explicitly mention non-binary gender identities nor use binary 
language – they are silent on the existence of gender identities other than F or M.21 
This changed in Principle 31 of the updated version, which recognises in Section C(ii) 
explicitly that not all people identify with the categories F or M by calling on states to 
“[m]ake available a multiplicity of gender marker options”. The creators of the 2017 
version likely intended with this phrase to demand the introduction of non-binary 
legal gender categories for all legal purposes. However, the literal focus on gender 
marker options leaves room for interpreting the phrase differently, since some states 
provide the option to register a non-binary gender marker on IDs, without having 
created an entire new legal gender category that is also registered in the civil registry 
and/or noted on the birth certificate. For example, in Malta, a person can register an X 
on the passport, identity card and residence permit, but keeps an F or M in the civil 
registry, which becomes relevant when the person encounters gender-specific laws 
(Calleja 2018). In the following section, I will mainly analyse the effects of introducing 
non-binary legal gender markers and non-binary legal gender categories for all legal 
purposes.  
 
The reference to non-binary legal gender categories in Principle 31 reflects an 
increasing awareness that F and M are not enough to describe all existing gender 
identities. In addition to countries introducing “third” legal categories, also 
international human rights bodies increasingly recognise the existence of non-binary 
gender identities. Shortly after the publication of the YP+10, the IACtHR in its 2017 
Advisory Opinion on Gender Identity, and Equality and Non-Discrimination of Same-Sex 
Couples was the first international court to recognise that some people identify with a 
gender other than female or male, or as both (para. 32(f)). By holding that persons 
identifying “with diverse gender identities must be recognized as such” (para. 15), it 
indirectly called out for the introduction of non-binary gender categories. This follows 
the approach taken by PACE in two resolutions prior to the publication of the YP+10: 
in 2015, a resolution called on member states to “consider including a third gender 
option in identity documents” (para. 6.2.4) and in 2017, another resolution demanded 
 
21 Dianne Otto criticised the original Principles for trying to fit diverse gender identities in the existing 
binary division of gender, such as through their definition of gender identity that partly serves “to 
reinstate (bio)logic which, in turn, re-naturalises the gender binary”(Otto 2015, pp. 313–314). The YP+10 
reaffirm YP’s definition on gender identity but recognise non-binary gender in Principle 31.  
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that “a range of options are available for all people, including those intersex people 
who do not identify as either male or female” (para. 7.3.3).22  
 
Losses of and requirements for non-binary gender registration  
 
Even though an increasing number of jurisdictions recognise non-binary legal gender 
categories, many barriers continue to exist for non-binary persons to access these new 
categories. The exact procedures to change the legal gender to a non-binary category 
often remain unclear and/or bureaucratic hurdles make it difficult to make these 
changes. For example, Bangladesh’s decision to recognise a “third” legal gender in 
2013 still lacks proper implementation. Reports show that the local hijra communities, 
persons not identifying with F or M, continue to experience difficulties in receiving 
identity cards with a non-binary gender marker and voter registration forms continue 
to mention only F and M (Aziz and Azhar 2019). Obtaining identification documents 
with a third gender marker could have material benefits for Bangladeshi hijra, as this 
would allow them to apply for particular entitlements reserved for scheduled classes, 
such as seats in decision-making organs and access to ration cards (Aziz and Azhar 
2019, p. 9). The situation differs in Pakistan, where the change to a third legal gender, 
which was introduced for the khawaja sira community in 2009, can result in socio-
economic losses for the persons concerned. Since Pakistani law is based on patriarchal 
legal traditions, khawaja sira who are legally registered with an M are often reluctant 
to change their legal gender to the new non-binary category as this would result in 
losing male legal privileges, such as receiving higher shares of inheritance (Nisar 
2018).23 Thus, local circumstances and the political and legal system influence the 
material advantages – or disadvantages – non-binary persons derive from being 
recognised with a “third” legal gender.  
 
In addition to losing male privileges, Muhammad Azfar Nisar reported in 2018 
that the khawaja sira community in Pakistan must also provide a medical declaration 
showing that they are “biologically” a third gender before the change to the non-
binary category is possible (p. 73). Even though this seems to have changed through 
 
22 The latter resolution adopted in 2017 follows two reports on the rights of intersex persons by the 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe and the EU Fundamental Rights Agency in 
2015, both recommending the consideration of alternatives to the current binary gender registration of 
intersex persons, including the introduction of gender-neutral markers (Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights 2015, p. 9; FRA 2015, p. 8). 
23 Pakistan has insufficiently addressed the issue of inheritance for trans persons in para. 7(3)(iii) of the 
Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2018.  
Reviewed Article                                       International Journal of Gender, Sexuality and Law 
115 
 
the adoption of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act (2018),24 many 
other jurisdictions with “third” legal gender categories continue to demand the 
applicants to fulfil certain conditions, such as providing medical and/or psychological 
attestations, before they can adopt these categories. For example, in 2018, Austria 
introduced the legal gender category “divers” as a result of decisions by its 
Constitutional Courts (Bundesministerium Inneres 2018). However, it restricted the 
access to the new categories to intersex persons who can certify that they are intersex.25 
This means that persons identifying with a gender different from M and F can only 
change their legal gender to “divers” if they have intersex variations.26 Intersex and 
trans rights organisations criticised this narrow scope of the new categories for 
reflecting the biological determinist idea that the body determines (legal) gender, and 
called for the establishment of unconditional procedures that ensure the change to 
“divers” based on a self-determined decision. This would mirror the situation in 
California and Tasmania, which, as already mentioned, have introduced non-binary 
categories while simultaneously abolishing all requirements for gender recognition 
(Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019 (TAS), Part 
4; Legislative Council California 2017).  
  
Legal gaps and cross-border issues created through non-binary gender categories 
 
As Jessica A. Clarke explains, the reluctance to introduce non-binary legal genders is 
often justified by arguing that creating new legal gender categories troubles the whole 
legal system and demands significant legal follow-up changes (Clarke 2019, p. 945). 
Undeniably, new gender categories do come with legal and bureaucratic hurdles. In 
its judgment on non-binary genders, the German Constitutional Court rightly held 
that introducing a new legal gender categories may create legal gaps with regards to 
gender-specific laws (1 BvR 2019/16 2017, paras. 53, 54). This means that in order to 
 
24 The Act has been celebrated as securing the right to self-identify as male, female or a blend of both 
genders without demanding any requirement for a change of legal gender (Hashim 2018). 
25 In 2018, Germany also introduced the gender category “divers” for intersex persons. However, in late 
2019, the Münster Local Court (Amtsgericht) determined that it would be unconstitutional to deny the 
applicant, an endosex person with a non-binary gender identity, to change their legal gender to divers, 
given the fact that the person could provide a medical attestation certifying their non-binary gender 
identity (AG Münster, 16.12.2019 - 22 III 36/19). Thus, in Germany, the access to the category “divers” 
is thus no longer limited to intersex persons.  
26 In a decision in February 2020, the Upper Austrian Regional Administrative Court held that the 
applicant could demand the change of their gender marker on the birth certificate also to “inter” and 
not only to “divers” (LVwG OÖ 18.02.2020, LVwG-750727/5/MZ).  
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avoid leaving persons with non-binary legal genders in a legal “no man’s land”27, it is 
necessary to render all laws distinguishing between women and men gender-neutral 
or specify their effects for non-binary persons. Relevant laws include, for instance, 
those concerning family relations (marriage, parenthood), the age of retirement and 
the conscription to the military. In addition, all government forms or online systems 
asking for gender information need to be changed.   
 
In addition to legal uncertainties created by non-binary legal gender categories 
within a country, persons concerned could experience problems in cross-border 
movements. For example, the United Arab Emirates reportedly deny entry to persons 
with an X marker on their passport (SafeTravelsMagazine 2018). Even though there is 
little information on the experiences of people travelling over national borders with 
an X or another non-binary gender marker on their passports,28 some countries 
anticipate problems. This is why Malta provides their citizens the option to get two 
passports, one with an M or F and another one with an X marker (Calleja 2018). 
Another issue is whether and how non-binary legal genders are recognised in other 
countries that recognise only F and M, such as with regards to marriage. These 
questions are determined through the private international law rules of the relevant 
countries. Maltese legislation explicitly states that it recognises a “gender marker other 
than male or female, or the absence thereof, recognized by a competent foreign court 
or responsible authority”(GIGESC Act 2015, para. 9(2)), but the law of other countries 
is rarely as straight-forward. Thus, to determine whether a country recognises “third” 
legal genders from other jurisdictions, a case-by-case analysis is needed, in a similar 






27 The creation of a so-called “no man’s land” was also a concern for the Registrar in the Australian 
Norrie case (2015), the landmark case introducing the legal gender category “non-specific” in New 
South Wales (Appellant’s Submissions. NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v. Norrie (S273 of 
2013) 2013, paras. 38–41; Bennett 2014). 
28 For example, in 2015, Human Rights Watch reported that a Nepali citizen with an O on their passport 
travelled to Taiwan without problems. In the same year, an Indian person’s visa application to the 
United States could not be processed, since the electronic system did not recognise gender markers 
other than F or M (Feder 2015; Knight 2015). The United States has been named as one jurisdiction that 
does not recognize gender markers other than F or M (Peter Dunne cited in Women and Equalities 
Committee, House of Commons 2015, pp. 12, 13). 
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Does the introduction of non-binary legal gender categories smash the binary? 
 
Introducing legal gender categories different from F and M seems to challenge the 
gender binary, since it makes genders outside of the dichotomy women/men 
institutionally visible. However, as it multiplies the boxes of genders, instead of 
getting rid of them, it does not necessarily lead to a “degendering movement”, as 
advocated for by Lorber. Registering gender, albeit through non-binary terms, still 
assumes that everybody can be boxed into a more or less stable category, an 
assumption that is also visible in the definition of gender identity in the YP, as recalled 
by the updated version of 2017. By describing gender identity as referring “to each 
person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender [emphasize 
added]”(p. 8), the YP presume that gender identity is an essential experience for all 
humans.29 This fails not only to consider people who do not identify with any gender, 
often referred to as agender, but also suggests that gender identity is innate and 
natural, which denies the shifting nature of some people’s gender identity and social 
influences on feelings of identity. Moreover, no country has so far introduced the 
possibility to be recognised with several genders, which the reference to the 
“multiplicity of gender marker options” by Principle 31 likely intends. Introducing 
third, fourth or even more legal gender categories further does not resolve the 
problem that with each category, new notions of normality for each category are 
created and with them also exclusions. As Butler says, “[i]dentity categories are never 
merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary”(1994, pp. 15–
16). The process of normalisation through the recognition of non-binary gender 
identities thus reflects power relations that render certain identities “legitimate” and 
others “illegitimate”. In addition, the static and normative categories of women and 
men are not necessarily challenged by creating a new category that classifies 
everybody who does not perfectly fit the binary gender. This could even reinforce 
stereotypical notions of female and male, since all exceptions are singled out from F 
and M.  
 
On the other hand, according to Butler, the feeling of legitimate personhood is 
connected to a desire of recognition (2004, p. 33). Being officially recognised with one’s 
gender identity cannot only increase social legitimacy and visibility, but also influence 
one’s self-respect. Indeed, a survey of 985 non-binary persons conducted in the United 
Kingdom in 2015 revealed that most of the survey participants felt that the lack of their 
 
29 Principle 3 of the Yogyakarta Principles similarly states that “each person’s self-defined sexual 
orientation and gender identity is integral to their personality and is one of the most basic aspects of 
self-determination, dignity and freedom”.  
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legal recognition negatively affected their social visibility, mental health and self-
esteem (Valentine 2015). Therefore, state recognition can not only positively impact 
the rights of gender non-conforming persons by providing them with material 
benefits, such as the access to particular entitlements in the case of Bangladeshi hijra,30 
but also act as normalisation resulting in the de-medicalisation and de-pathologisation 
of intersex and trans persons. However, what if the state never had the power to 
legitimise the gender of individuals through official recognition, would people still 
long for the official validation of their gender as part of legitimate personhood, as 
suggested by Butler?   
 
IV. Elimination of the public gender registration  
 
The most innovate aspect of the Principle 31 is the call in Section A to end the 
registration of sex and gender as part of one’s legal personality altogether. As 
mentioned above, the original YP approached the public gender registration in this 
regard quite differently, since they assume not only that everybody has a deeply felt 
internal gender identity that is integral to their personality, but also that it is important 
that this gender identity is recorded by the state. Principled 31 thus breaks with the 
naturalised idea that states register the gender of individuals, as also reflected in the 
original YP. Nonetheless, the drafters of the YP+10 acknowledged that gender 
registration is unlikely to be abolished overnight, as they provide suggestions on how 
sex or gender should be registered, as discussed above, so long as these continue to be 
part of the personal status registration.  
 
Albeit forward-looking, the call for ending the registration of gender for 
personal status purposes is not entirely new. For example, the outcome document of 
the Third International Intersex Forum in 2013, the Malta Declaration, demanded that 
“[i]n the future, as with race or religion, sex or gender should not be a category on 
birth certificates or identification documents for anybody” (Third International 
Intersex Forum 2013). This relates to Lorber’s call for a “feminist degendering 
movement”, whereby she draws the analogy of gender to other socially constructed 
categories, such as race, ethnicity and class, and argues that “the belief that gender 
 
30 Reducing the marginalisation and ensuring the constitutional rights of communities concerned was 
also an objective of the Indian Supreme Court when recognising “third” legal genders in 2014 (National 
Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others, 2014, paras. 126, 129(1)). Moreover, the Uruguayan 
Trans Bill, adopted in October 2018, foresees that 1% of government jobs are reserved for trans persons 
(Ley Integral Para Personas Trans 2018). 
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divisions are normal and natural is still an underlying frame for modern social life” 
(2000, p. 80). Thus, despite the fact that activists and scholars have considered the 
elimination of the public gender registration for some time now, international legal 
institutions have not addressed this possibility of law reform yet.  
 
Exceptions to the universal registration of gender 
 
Even though international bodies have not yet considered the possibility of abolishing 
the mandatory recording of legal genders, some states already provide exceptions to 
the universal registration of gender. For example, in 2018, an adult received the first 
Argentinian birth certificate stating no gender, an option guaranteed by the 
Argentinian Gender Identity Law (Simpson 2018). Similarly, the 2018 amendment of 
the German personal status law clarifies that according to paragraph 22(3) intersex 
persons, who provide a medical attestation or an affidavit confirming their intersex 
variation, can ask for the deletion of their gender from the civil registry, in addition to 
requesting of being registered with the gender category “divers” (PStG 2007, paras. 
22(3), 45b). Previous decisions by German courts held that paragraph 22(3) can also 
be applied to endosex trans persons, which means that they can equally delete their 
gender registration (BVerfG, 10.10.2017 - 1 BvR 2019/16, paras. 13, 43; OLG Celle, 
12.05.2017 - 17 W 5/17; AG Stade, 21.11.2016 -51 III 13/16). The legal position of persons 
without any legal gender with regards to gender-specific laws, such as concerning 
marriage or parental status, in Germany and Argentina is yet to be specified.31  
  
Other exceptions to the universal registration of gender concern children, in 
particular intersex new-borns. A report published by the EU Fundamental Rights 
Agency in 2015 shows that a few EU member states provide the possibility to delay 
the gender registration of new-borns with intersex variations (FRA 2015, pp. 4–5). In 
most of these countries, the postponement of a child’s gender registration is only 
temporary and gender must be recorded on the birth certificate and/or the civil 
registry within a certain period, such as within three years after birth in France (FRA 
2015, p. 5; Ghattas 2013, p. 32). However, in a few countries, such as Austria, Germany 
and the Netherlands, there is no final deadline when the gender of an intersex child 
has to be registered in the civil registry, which creates the possibility that children 
 
31 For example, it is unclear whether persons registered without a legal gender in the Netherlands and 
Germany could marry, since marriage in these two countries is possible for “two persons of different 
or the same sex” (Dutch Civil Code, Art. 1:30(1); Gesetz zur Einführung des Rechts auf Eheschließung für 
Personen gleichen Geschlechts, 2017; Van den Brink, Reuß and Tigchelaar 2015, p. 287). 
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concerned become adults without any legal gender.32 One major issue here is that as 
the exception in these three countries concerns only intersex persons, the gender 
binary is not necessarily challenged, but rather reinforced, because intersex persons 
are “othered” and framed as “exception to the rule” (Holzer 2019, pp. 99–101). This 
“othering” of intersex children was avoided in Malta, which, in 2015, created the 
precedent of granting all parents or legal guardians the possibility to postpone a new-
born’s gender registration until the child’s 18th birthday (GIGESC Act 2015, para 7(4)).33 
However, children must eventually register a gender at the age of 18 and the number 
of parents opting for this possibility seems low.34  
 
The effects of eliminating the legal gender registration on gender politics 
 
At the heart of much controversy in debates on reforming gender registration 
procedures is the role that legal gender categories play in gender politics. Indeed, one 
side effect of eliminating legal gender categories would be the establishment of 
complete formal gender equality, since laws could no longer differentiate between 
people based on their gender. Thus, gender-specific laws, for instance with regards to 
the military, retirement age, family law and inheritance rights, would need to be 
rendered gender-neutral. Nonetheless, even if laws were generally gender-neutral, 
the gender of individuals could continue to play a role for determining the eligibility 
to gender affirmative action. However, according to Gössl and Völzmann, eliminating 
legal genders would be unlikely to pose a problem to the undertaking of gender 
affirmative action, since the access to gender affirmative action is already nowadays 
rarely dependent upon a person’s legal gender. Instead, it mostly relies on self-
 
32 Paragraph 22(3) of the German Personal Status Law creates the possibility to leave the gender 
registration of an intersex new-born blank (PStG 2007, p. 22(3)). Similarly, Article 1:19d(1) of the Dutch 
Civil Code holds that “[i]f the child’s gender cannot be established”, the child receives an interim birth 
certificate for three months indicating that the sex could not be “established”. If after three months the 
child’s gender has still not been “established” by a medical certificate, the final birth certificate is issued, 
stating once more that the child’s sex has not been determined (Van den Brink, Reuß and Tigchelaar 
2015, p. 286). In Austria, the gender marker on birth certificates of intersex children can equally be left 
“open”, until information on the “medical development” of the child is provided (Bundesministerium 
Inneres 2018, p. 3). 
33 The German Institute for Human Rights recommends the same measure for Germany, but without 
imposing a time limit on having a blank gender registration, such as the 18th birthday in Malta (Althoff 
et al. 2017, p. 69).  
34 A policy maker in Malta confirmed in an interview in Spring 2018 that no parents had postponed the 
gender registration of their new-born within the first three years of the law (Calleja 2018). 
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identification or the perception by others (Gössl and Völzmann 2019, pp. 420–421).35 
Yet, determining the eligibility for gender affirmative action by relying on the 
perception of a person’s gender by others raises similar problems as when gender 
markers are used for identification purposes. Establishing a person’s gender solely 
through external perception of a person’s bodily appearance and gender expression 
means that the person making the judgment relies on their own understandings of 
how women, men or any other gender look like or are named. These are likely 
influenced by stereotypical and cis- and endosexnormative gender norms. Using self-
identification as eligibility criteria for gender affirmative action instead has also raised 
some controversy, similar to the discussions on basing gender recognition procedures 
on self-identification, for example with regards to fraud. For instance, the clarification 
of the UK labour party to use self-identification as method to determine access to the 
party’s all-women shortlist resulted in 300 cis women leaving the party and claiming 
that self-identification means that “any man can simply claim to be a woman” 
(Mayday4Women 2018).36 Thus, even though legal genders are no precondition for 
undertaking gender affirmative action, using self-identification or the perception by 
others as eligibility tests for gender affirmative action do not remain without 
controversies.  
 
In addition to the (ir)relevance of legal gender categories for gender affirmative 
action, one should not forget the symbolic value of state recognition when discussing 
the elimination of legal genders. Some states have introduced non-binary legal gender 
categories explicitly in order to advance the social acceptance of non-binary persons. 
For example, by officially recognising a “third gender” in 2012, the Indian Supreme 
Court intended to reduce the socio-economic marginalisation and ensure the 
constitutional rights of hijra (NALSA v. Union of India and others 2014, paras. 126, 
129(1)). Indeed, some trans persons see value in the legal recognition of their gender 
as this can transfer social legitimacy upon them and provide them a tool to publicly 
manifest their identity (Clarke 2019, p. 951; Cooper and Renz 2016, pp. 495–496; James 
Morton cited in Women and Equalities Committee, House of Commons 2015, p. 13). 
As discussed above, having legal proof of one’s gender can at times assist gender non-
conforming persons to be protected from societal mistreatment, for instance when 
being denied access to gender-segregated resources, such as homeless shelters, 
prisons, bathrooms and sport teams (Neuman Wipfler 2016, p. 541). The value of being 
recognised with one’s legal gender is reflected in the abovementioned survey on non-
 
35  The preferential treatment scheme for Bangladeshi hijra provides a contrary example, since the legal 
registration as a third gender is determinative for accessing the reserved entitlements for hijra in 
Bangladesh (Aziz and Azhar 2019, p. 9). 
36  See also: Zeffman 2018. 
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binary persons in the UK conducted in 2015. 73% of the survey participants wished 
for the introduction of third gender category, whereas only 41% of the participants 
thought that eliminating gender markers on identification documents was the best 
option for reforming the public gender registration (Valentine 2015, pp. 22, 73). Thus, 
the public recognition of one’s gender identity, whether binary or not, can contain a 
significant positive symbolic value and increases a person’s social acceptance (Bennett 
2014, p. 866).  
 
Apart from the symbolic value, legally registered genders can also help to make 
gender disparities visible in data collection, since a lot of gender-disaggregated data 
is currently derived from state registries. Having access to gender-disaggregated data 
is crucial for rendering social inequalities between different genders in a population 
visible, which also helps to make political claims on behalf of marginalised gendered 
groups.37 However, as briefly discussed above, states can replace the use of state 
registries with other data collection methods that they use for collecting data on other 
social categories (e.g. race or ethnicity), such as surveys.  
 
Does the elimination of the public gender registrations smash the binary? 
 
Abolishing the public gender registration would end the practice of using gender – a 
socially constructed category – for creating dichotomous legal classifications of 
humans and could thus create more room for diverse gender identities and 
expressions. As succinctly put by Andrea Büchler and Michelle Cottier, “the 
elimination of the legal category gender would have a liberating effect, since the 
biologisation, ontologization and essentialization of the differences between genders 
would have no legal basis anymore” (Büchler and Cottier 2005, p. 131 [transl. from 
German into English by author]). This “degendering movement”, as demanded by 
Lorber, could “liberate human personality from the straightjacket of gender” (Lorber 
cited by Clarke 2019, p. 915), which would have an emancipatory effect on society in 
general, since it could help dismantling gender norms that construct women and men 
as naturally different, opposite and complementary identities. In addition to reducing 
 
37 The discussion on questions asked in censuses illustrate how important data on social disparities are 
for making political claims on behalf of marginalised groups. For example, in the United States, various 
ethnic groups, such as Arab Americans, have demanded the inclusion of an ethnic category that fits 
their identity on the census, since this could result in the group’s consideration in the struggle for 
receiving public resources. Similarly, LGB persons have demanded (in vain) that the census in 2020 
asks a question about the respondent’s sexual orientation, as this is hoped to result in government 
action for queer persons (Browne 2016; Omi and Winant 2014, p. 122; Schilt and Bratter 2015, p. 78). 
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law’s discursive and normative effects to (re)produce the gender binary in society, it 
could resolve many human rights challenges for LGBTIQ persons. This includes the 
alleviation of stress from gender non-conforming persons, who would no longer need 
to worry whether their legal gender fits their gender expression and/or identity in a 
cisnormative and endosexnormative way. Moreover, legal genders could no longer be 
used for restricting people’s right to marry the person of choice or to adopt a child. As 
doctors and parents would not need to assign an F and M to a newborn on the birth 
certificate, they could be less pressured to conduct genital mutilations on intersex 
children, even though the practice would still need to be prohibited in order to 
effectively protect intersex children’s bodily integrity (Carpenter 2018; Lembke 2011, 
p. 6).  
 
However, the de-institutionalisation of the gender binary by eliminating the 
gender registration for personal status purposes would not necessarily resolve 
hierarchical relationships in society that are based on the gender binary, such as the 
systematic oppression of women and LGBTIQ persons. Instead, abolishing the public 
gender registration could even take away a tool of strategic essentialism, a term coined 
by Spivak to describe the idea that group ascriptions are sometimes necessary in order 
to represent marginalised people, enhance their institutional visibility and make 
political claims on their behalf (Bennett 2014, pp. 866–867; Butler 2004, pp. 32–33; 
Spivak 1990, p. 109). Indeed, Lorber notices the risk that gender-neutral policies in 
certain contexts, such as development programmes in countries with low levels of 
gender equality, could make laws and policies “gender blind”. This could have 
counterproductive effects for marginalised gendered groups, for instance women and 
girls, since their needs could likely be overlooked (Lorber 2000, p. 89). Thus, the public 
registration of gender can also create visibility of gender non-conforming individuals 
and, as discussed above, provide social legitimacy to them.  
 
This last issue points to a larger question on the possibility of smashing the 
binary through legal means. Similar to Butler, who argues that “[i]nternational human 
rights is always in the process of subjecting the human to redefinition and 
renegotiation” (2004, p. 33), Ratna Kapur stipulates that human rights are inherently 
normative and prescribe value to certain ways of being (2018, p. 17). Smashing the 
binary, on the other hand, describes the attempt to resolve normative hierarchies 
based on the idea that women and men are stable, complementary and opposite 
entities. It aims to dismantle regulatory schemes that prescribe how people have to 
conduct themselves with regards to gender and sexuality. Eliminating legal gender 
categories thus seems promising for the purpose of breaking with normative 
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ascriptions about legitimate genders and sexualities, but is the absence of law entirely 
norm-free? Does the absence of legal gender categories halt the ascription of 
normative value to genders and sexualities? Or could it reinforce the dominant status 
quo by giving away the possibility of making certain groups institutionally visible?  
 
Conclusions: Challenging state control over gender while using the normative power 
of states for fostering gender diversity 
 
While the original YP (2007) have been called “modest”, the updated version of 2017 
is expressively visionary as reflected in the four main innovations concerning gender 
registration proposed by Principle 31. All of the four measures analysed face specific 
limitations in how they smash the gender binary, but all of them trouble the naturalised 
understanding of dichotomous (legal) gender relations. Indeed, eliminating gender 
markers from identification documents, as envisioned by Principle 31, would reduce 
the state’s influence of “policing” gender expressions by ending the practice of using 
gender markers for identification purpose. However, in a gender-divided world, 
gender markers can also serve as legitimisation of one’s identity and be useful for 
gender non-conforming persons to fight their way into gender-divided spaces and 
services.  
 
Unconditional gender recognition laws, on the other hand, not only ensure the 
right to self-determination for trans and intersex persons, but can also contest the 
boundaries between socially accepted notions of men and women, since a person’s 
body, including its appearance and reproductive functions, does not determine the 
person’s legal gender anymore. Nevertheless, these unconditional gender recognition 
laws often allow a change of legal gender only from F to M or vice versa, except for 
California and Tasmania, and mostly continue to assume that everybody has one 
“true” and stable gender that is recorded by the state. This means that they mostly 
make travelling between the gender binary easier, but rarely smash it.  
 
The proposal by Principle 31 to ensure a multiplicity of gender marker options 
challenges the gender binary by acknowledging that gender identities other than F 
and M exist. However, non-binary legal gender categories still expect that gender can 
be “boxed” into square categories, even if it is an X, without recognising that with each 
box, some exclusions are created. In addition, the new gender categories in Austria 
and Germany are examples for legal developments that could even reinforce the 
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gender binary, since intersex persons are singled out and “othered”, as they are the 
only ones who can access the new categories. Thus, it depends on the exact legal 
construction of non-binary legal gender categories in their specific context and 
whether other measures are complementarily taken to weaken the relevance of legal 
genders in order to understand whether new legal gender categories help smashing 
the binary.  
 
Lastly, eliminating the public gender registration, as envisioned for the future 
by the creators of the YP+10, would undermine an important pillar of the 
institutionalisation of the gender binary and resolve many formal human rights 
challenges for LGBTIQ persons. It would stop seeing gender as fixed, stable and 
legally relevant personal characteristics. Yet, the downside of this measure would be 
that gender categories can serve in some instances as tools of “strategic essentialism” 
for making marginalised groups, including non-binary persons and women, 
institutionally visible, including in data collection, and transferring social legitimacy 
upon them. Thus, the absence of legal regulations about gender assignment seems 
promising for smashing the binary and creating more acceptance of gender non-
conforming persons. Yet, this could also take away a mechanism for enhancing their 
public visibility.  
 
Principle 31 is dealing with the paradox of trying to decrease the influence of 
the state in the assignment of gender, such as through the elimination of gender 
registrations, while at the same time using state recognition in order to create more 
acceptance of gender diversity and ensure the rights of gender non-conforming 
persons. The dual role of legal categorisation, on the one hand, to act as political tool 
of strategic essentialism and, on the other hand, to forcefully draw division between 
people needs to be considered when undertaking reform projects in a specific context. 
Thus, the combination of the four measures proposed by Principle 31 makes the YP+10 
innovative, but also realistic, by taking into account the current role and use of legal 
gender categories. Principle 31 thus demands for a simultaneous process of reducing 
the naturalised state control over people’s gender assignment while making sure that 
where it (still) has control, it valorises gender diversity outside of a binary frame. In 
any case, Principle 31 reflects a new era in which states lose their authority to act as 
(sole) arbiters of people’s official gender assignment. 
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